Identity-Based Appeals: Explaining Changing Strategies of the Indigenous Movement in Bolivia

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Abstract
Current social movement literature does not adequately analyze how a movement’s strategies may change once a member or even leader of that movement assumes the country’s highest office. Movements, especially those in which identity plays a key role, gain the tool of identity-based appeals once their leader takes office, that is, claiming that the new leader should act favorably to the movement because of their common characteristics. Analysis of the Bolivian indigenous movement shows that since indigenous leader Evo Morales has assumed the presidency, the movement has used this tactic toward various audiences in response to Morales’ incomplete meeting of their policy demands. The movement first appealed directly to Morales, but has since shifted its focus to the public, attempting to increase agitation by emphasizing the contrast between Morales’ discourse and actions. This case shows that contrary to assumptions made in the ethnic parties literature, an ethnic leader will not necessarily favor his base uniformly once he takes office. Rather, the movement continues, but now with a different type of “target” - one which had previously been an ally.

Introduction
The election of Evo Morales as Bolivia’s leader in 2005 made history, as he became Latin America’s first indigenous president. His victory was widely hailed in Bolivia and internationally as a sign of great progress for the indigenous, who assumed that the election of the former leader of their movement would allow them unprecedented advances in the recognition of their rights. While some such strides have indeed taken place under the Morales government, it would be a mistake to conclude that the movement has somehow won or that its struggle has been completed upon the election of Morales. Morales has not fulfilled all of the hopes that the indigenous had upon his taking office, and there has in fact been a significant division between him and the movement in recent years. This case shows that contrary to assumptions made in the ethnic parties literature (to be expanded upon below), an ethnic leader will not necessarily favor his base uniformly once he takes office. Thus, when a social movement, even one based strongly on identity, sees its leader elected, this does not signify victory or an end point for the movement. Rather, the movement continues, but now with a different type of “target” - one which had previously been an ally. That a former movement leader will not necessarily comply with the movement’s demands once in office is key, as this fact shapes the new strategies available to the movement now that its target has shifted. How exactly does the movement adjust, though? Specifically, how do the strategies of a social movement, especially one based strongly on identity, change when someone of that identity takes power?
I argue that a main way in which the social movement’s strategies shift under these circumstances is through the use of identity-based appeals. Identity-based appeals refer to implicit or explicit accusations against a member of one’s own ethnicity that he or she is not acting as a member of that
ethnic group “ought to.” Literature within ethnic politics suggests circumstances under which a group might employ this tactic to achieve some goal, though it is usually examined as involving members of a group using identity-based appeals or “shaming” toward other members within their community rather than toward a political leader as in the case of Bolivia. David Laitin discusses this type of shaming in several works, arguing for example that for marginal and minority ethnic groups in a country, members of the unassimilated group may have interest in preventing their co-ethnics from assimilating through what he calls “internal policing” (Laitin 1995: 39, Laitin 1998, 124-5).1 Alternatively, it may be a political leader rather than others within the community who shame members of an ethnic group. For example, Catalan government officials would make it financially unfeasible for parents to send their children to a Spanish school within the Catalan region because they had an interest in maintaining the Catalan community intact (Laitin 2007). However, these few theories that address identity-based appeals only discuss how identity-based appeals or shaming may be used against members of a community; I believe, though, that they can also be used against political leaders.

Notably, I do not seek to explain whether identity-based appeals influence the policy decisions of the president, which are undoubtedly affected by countless factors. This individual’s behavior is important, though, to the extent that the social movement shapes its strategies based on the leader’s past or expected future policies. Knowing how these strategies evolve is key to understanding how underrepresented social sectors interact with their governments, particularly when the government is expected to act favorably toward a given group because of their common characteristics.

This paper will proceed in the following manner. I will first review the relevant literature on both ethnic parties and social movements, after which I will elaborate on my theory. Next, I provide background information on the Bolivian case as well as a discussion of my methodology. The paper then discusses how the theory I put forth applies to the Bolivian indigenous movement. The final section concludes.

**Existing Theories**

**Ethnic Parties**

The literature on ethnic parties should suggest how the ethnic base will respond to its leader taking power, but it does not sufficiently analyze the relationship between the base and the leader after the point of the leader’s election. It often fails to consider that if the base is not satisfied with the leader’s performance in office, it will have to adjust its strategies as it continues to struggle to see its demands met. Instead, many works assume that ethnic party leaders will always provide benefits to members of their own group in exchange for their votes (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972, Horowitz 1985, 1993, Dawson 1994, Mitchell 1995, Chandran 2004, Posner 2005, Birnir 2007, Shoup 2007). Theorists in this vein often discuss how leaders of an ethnic party may best convince all or most of the members of that ethnic group to lend their electoral support without considering whether and how elites may target policies beyond any strict boundaries of their own ethnic group. For example, Kanchan Chandra argues that in patronage democracies such as India, there exists “a self-enforcing equilibrium of ethnic

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1 See also Wimmer 2008 for discussion of how elite members of a non-majority group use identity-based appeals toward co-ethnics.
favouritism, in which voters mainly target co-ethnic politicians for favours, and politicians mainly target co-ethnic voters for votes” (Chandra 2004, 64). Though co-ethnic voters may be the “main” targets, Chandra does not consider under what, if any, conditions a politician would deviate from this norm. Likewise, Jóhanna Kristín Birnir argues that ethnic parties provide a stabilizing force in new democracies because membership in an ethnic group provides information about whom to vote for, thus minimizing uncertainty because elites from a given ethnic group will target members of that group for mobilization (Birnir 2007). Again, though, she does not consider that elites may additionally target broader sectors of the population. Finally, Donald Horowitz points out that ethnic party systems are inherently unstable because there is only one dimension for elites to mobilize along and they cannot gain the support of voters from other parties (Horowitz 1985).

This focus on mobilization is troubling for two reasons. First, mandatory voting laws in Bolivia and many other Latin American countries eliminate the need for voter mobilization with which this literature assumes is a primary concern of parties. Second, even if it were always necessary for candidates to mobilize voters, their pool of potential supporters may be broader than just members of their own ethnic group. Ethnic parties literature that focuses on mobilization assumes that ethnicity is an exclusive identity, failing to consider that ethnicity can be fluid and that an ethnic party may try to reach voters who are not members of that ethnicity. For example, Chandra argues that one of the conditions an ethnic party must meet in order to be successful in a patronage democracy is that the ethnic group that it is attempting to mobilize be larger than whatever a given electoral system determines the threshold for winning to be (Chandra 2004). The claim that a party cannot succeed if its exclusive ethnic group is not large enough indicates that Chandra has not considered that the relationship between a party leader and his base may be more flexible rather than limited to mobilizing one ethnic group. Likewise, Horowitz specifically explains that because ethnicity is ascriptive, individuals do not change their party affiliations in ethnic party systems as they would in non-ethnic party systems, again not analyzing how an ethnic party could attract voters beyond one exclusive group (Horowitz 1985).

Moreover, some research explicitly defines an ethnic party by its exclusivist mobilization of one ethnic group. Gunther and Diamond state in their 2003 typology, for instance, that “the purely ethnic party seeks only to mobilize the votes of its own ethnic group... Although it may run candidates in other geographic constituencies, or raise larger national or even ideological issues, these only thinly and half-heartedly mask its true ethnic (or regional) purpose” (Gunther and Diamond 2003, 183; Kitschelt 2001). These authors believe that if an ethnic party raises issues beyond its narrow ethnicity or region, it must be for purposes of appearance only rather than true motives to extend its base.²

² Clearly, the notion that leaders and voters have set ethnicities which govern political calculations is widespread; however, not all theories of ethnic voting take ethnicities as entirely fixed, and scholars such as Daniel Posner take key steps in explaining that different identities will be emphasized under different institutional contexts. Posner describes how varying electoral rules in Africa determine whether it is the national or local electoral arena which is most important and hence whether people vote along regional and linguistic lines or along tribal and clan lines, respectively. While Posner’s work thus accurately emphasizes the complexity of ethnicity, he nonetheless remains focused on African voters’ desire to put members of their own ethnic group in power, thus making the implicit assumption that an ethnic group is fixed whether it is defined by regional, linguistic, tribal, or other features. See Posner 2007.
This depiction of ethnic parties as having exclusionary ties between a leader and base implies an obvious and strict definition of who is and is not a member of a given ethnicity. Such a conception of ethnicity is at odds with much other prominent work in ethnic politics that discusses ethnicity as socially constructed rather than inherent (Barth 1969, Geertz 1973, Laitin 1986, Connor 1993, Eller and Coughlin 1993, Laitin 1995, 1998, Fearon and Laitin 2000, Chandra 2001, Kurzban, Tooby and Cosmides 2001, Posner 2003, Brubaker 2004, Brubaker, Loveman and Stamatov 2004, Laitin 2007, Kalyvas 2008, Chandra 2012). This work explicitly or implicitly defines ethnicity and ethnic boundaries as being shaped from various historical, social, and political circumstances, meaning that voters’ and leaders’ ethnicities are not automatic like the ethnic parties literature suggests they are. It is important to consider the meaning of an ethnicity and particularly an ethnic base beyond a narrow, exclusive definition because it is difficult to accurately analyze the interactions between leader and base without recognizing the exact nature of their bond.

In particular, one must consider that leaders can shape followers’ ethnicities because identities can be fluid and malleable. In contrast to the ethnic parties literature, research in other realms of the ethnic politics and nationalism literatures has discussed this idea. For example, one development within the constructivist school has suggested that elites play a critical role in framing the ethnic identities of their publics and in putting an “ethnic spin” on events which may not inherently be ethnic-based. For example, Paul Brass explains that what is often readily accepted as Hindu-Muslim violence in India may not always be motivated by ethnic hatred at all. Rather, both Hindu and Muslim politicians use acts of violence to persuade voters that they must be protected from the “other” and to present their opponents as incapable of defending minorities or even as the perpetrators of violence against them (Brass 1997). Other theorists suggest that elites not only frame events as ethnic after their occurrence but in fact may actively manipulate the ethnic identities of their supporters in order to gain or maintain political advantage. John Mueller contends, for instance, that the violent conflicts that occurred in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Croatia in the 1990s were not cases of entire ethnic groups fighting against one another but of elites mobilizing small groups of armed thugs around ethnic identity. Ethnicity thus served simply as an “ordering device” as elites emphasized the differences between their supporters and the “other” to incite the thugs to violence (Mueller 2000). James Fearon and David Laitin further emphasize the potential for elite agency to foment ethnic violence, describing how elites may convince their followers of the need to act violently against an “other” to fend off challenges to their popularity from both elites of a different ethnic group and more moderate elites within their own group.3 While such arguments make it clear that elites play an important role in shaping the ethnic identities of their followers, theories about elite manipulation of ethnic identity are more prominent in the context of violence, with a dearth of literature considering how a similar shaping of ethnicity by elites may occur in everyday democratic politics.

Work that does address how elites of an ethnic party may court non co-ethnics is that by Raúl Madrid on ethnopolitism. Madrid argues that ethnopolitist parties, meaning those making both ethnic and populist appeals, have succeeded in Latin America more than traditional ethnic parties. This is because

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3 Fearon and Laitin 2000. The authors also note that non-elites may have agency in the construction of their identities, for example using violence to “prove” their membership in a group.
they take advantage of the ethnic fluidity of the region by appealing to both indigenous people as well as people of other identities who support the parties because of their platform on issues not related to ethnicity. In his study of the 2005 presidential election in Bolivia, Madrid examines the factors leading to the victory of MAS, an ethnopopulist party. He analyzes the characteristics of voters and finds that people who identified with MAS’ traditional leftist, populist message, as well as people who identified with its ethnic appeals, were both more likely to vote for MAS. His key point is that while indigenous groups were an important support sector for MAS, it won the election because it was able to use populist appeals to broaden its support base (Madrid 2008).

In other works, Madrid shows that the utility of ethnopopulism extends beyond Bolivia. In an article on ethnic voting in Peru, he demonstrates that this combination of ethnic and populist appeals can be successful even if not made by an indigenous leader or party. He points out that Alberto Fujimori, Alejandro Toledo, and Ollanta Humala have been able to appeal to indigenous voters, even though none of these presidents are purely indigenous themselves, by using a mix of ethnic and populist appeals (Madrid 2011). Most recently, in his 2012 book, Madrid expands on his argument from the articles on Peru and Bolivia, examining indigenous parties in seven countries, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Colombia, and Venezuela. His explanation of why some have been more successful than others is that “the type of appeals used by indigenous parties explains to a large degree their electoral performance. Indigenous parties - and some mestizo-led parties - have succeeded where they have used a combination of inclusive ethnic and populist appeals” (Madrid 2012).

Madrid is correct to point out the importance of ethnic fluidity in Latin America in particular. The exclusive definition of ethnic parties in most of the literature, the exceptions just noted aside, is quite problematic for analyzing ethnic identities in Latin America, where identities across the region are not easily dichotomized into “indigenous” and “non-indigenous.” Many people throughout Latin America consider themselves to be of mixed ethnicity, often using a combination of genealogy and familial customs and upbringing to determine the identities that they feel loyal to. This means that indigenous elites are not limited to making electoral appeals only to purely indigenous citizens; rather, they may attempt to expand the definition of indigenous to include mestizos, people of mixed heritage. In mobilizing the indigenous vote, then, there is not a fixed group of potential supporters from which party leaders may draw.4

In addition to allowing the leader more flexibility in determining campaign appeals, ethnic fluidity also, crucially, affects the actions of the base. Works claiming that citizens determine whom to vote for simply by looking for the candidate who shares their ethnicity underestimate the degree of agency that the citizens hold. If a voter will always choose based on shared ethnicity, then neither a leader’s planned policies during the campaign nor his actual policies once in office affect his base’s support for him. Though this notion seems implausible, it does match up with the literature’s assumption that a leader’s policies in office will always favor the base, because a leader’s policies that help his co-ethnics will not diminish their support for him. If, though, a leader implements policies adverse to the base’s interests, the base must have agency to respond rather than blindly continuing to support the leader on his

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ethnicity alone. This response may be made through withdrawing electoral support in future elections and/or attempting to persuade the leader to favor the base’s interests. Analyzing the potential responses of an ethnic base to a leader’s unfavorable policies are a key way in which I will contribute to the ethnic parties literature.

**Social Movements**

The social movement literature has to this point been largely concerned with understanding why social movements emerge, with comparatively little progress made on how they evolve once achieving some level of success, specifically the election of their former leader. Explanations of movements’ emergence have gone through several paradigms, with original theories focusing on deprivation and arguing that grievances lead to mobilization. This idea was replaced by resource mobilization theories which explained that the amount of money and labor available to a group determined whether they could form as a social movement. The mobilization of resources has been criticized, however, as a necessary but insufficient condition for social movement formation, leading this paradigm to be largely replaced by theories stressing political opportunity structure, that is, that varying opportunities such as open political institutions and elite ruptures determine when a group will find opportunities to use its resources (Tarrow 1998). This paradigm has been applied directly to Bolivia, with authors such as Deborah Yashar explaining that greater political associational space is what allowed for the emergence of regional indigenous organizations (Yashar 2005).

While there has certainly been progress on the question of why social movements emerge, though, the evolution of their strategies remains relatively undertheorized. Works addressing how social movements choose their strategies have largely focused to this point on the concept of repertoires, or the range of options available to a movement. A main proponent of this notion is Charles Tilly, who coined the term repertoire (Tilly 1977) and discusses the concept in several works. Tilly explains that at any point in history, people only know of a small number of modes of contention, which are shaped by earlier forms of protest. The history of contention thus plays a large role in determining the current repertoire, with other political and cultural variables also determining the types of action deemed acceptable. That is, forms of contentious action shift only gradually, so a movement cannot choose a tactic that is very different from the existing and accepted forms of protest (Tilly 1993). If a movement wishes to expand the repertoire of contention, it can only do so by making innovations at the margins of the existing repertoire. For example, a strike may be conventional, but combining a strike with an occupation would be an innovation at the margins (Tarrow 1998, 31-47). Because a movement can only make such small adjustments to existing tactics, it is quite limited in its strategic choices. The repertoires literature examines the factors influencing the tactics that make up a repertoire, but it does not consider how movements choose from within this repertoire (Jasper 1997). Repertoires are

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5 See McCarthy and Zald 1977 for a criticism of the deprivation paradigm and a discussion of resource mobilization theory.
6 See Clemens 1993, 755 for an application of the repertoire notion to the organizational form of social movements. Clemens claims that new social movement organizational forms are more likely to be successful if they resemble familiar and societally accepted forms that were not previously political.
only discussed as limiting; in this view, social movements are not truly free to make their own tactical choices because they are constrained by factors such as history and culture. As Jasper puts it in his 2004 work, the literature focuses far too much on structure and far too little on agency (Jasper 2005). It is useful to note that movements may face certain restrictions in their tactical choices, but it is much more interesting to know how they make choices despite limitations. Unfortunately, though, this emphasis on structure that Jasper points to is a larger problem in the strategies literature, beyond just the notion that actors are limited by existing repertoires. As he describes, the way that the social movements literature has viewed strategies has been heavily influenced by the series of paradigms discussing their emergence, with the idea being that whatever concerns most affect a movement’s emergence will also be the most important issues upon which a movement bases its strategies (Jasper 2005). In particular, resource mobilization and political opportunity structure approaches have viewed social movements’ strategic choices as attempts to find the most effective way to achieve their end goals, implying that tactics follow naturally from external conditions such as resource availability (Jasper 1999). This can be seen in Gamson’s seminal 1975 work that focuses on the structural conditions that determine which strategies are effective, making the implicit assumption that movements are cognizant of these constraints and base their decisions on them (Gamson 1975).

This view is problematic because theories about strategies that focus too much on structure do not allow for the analysis of movement agency. For instance, Jasper discusses Herbert Kitschelt’s work on antinuclear movements as an example of an argument that lends great weight to political opportunity structure variables in determining a movement’s strategies (Jasper 1999). Kitschelt argues that where there is an open political structure, the movement will use an assimilative approach, trying to work through the existing structure, but that where the political structure is closed, the movement will use a more confrontational strategy (Kitschelt 1986). Unfortunately, this emphasis on structure does not allow Kitschelt to explain how strategies may evolve within a short time period even when the political opportunity structure does not change (Jasper 1999). Thus, a focus on both repertoires and structural factors as determining the strategies of social movements disallows a proper examination of the movements’ agency. I argue that though it is necessary to consider these factors, we must also explain how movements make active choices despite constraints from existing repertoires and other structural factors.

Because works on social movement strategies do not consider how movements select from within their range of options, they cannot assess why movements would make one such selection at one time and a different choice later. Some works do assess reasons for strategic shift, but do not assign agency in determining when or what type of shift will occur. Tarrow discusses one such reason for tactical change, claiming that since mobilization declines because of exhaustion, protests become more radical as the moderates defect first (Tarrow 1998). Movement tactics thus become violent over time, but not because of active choices made by the movement. In a different vein, Paul Burnstein discusses how social movements may choose their strategies based on having various goals, including changing legislators’ perceptions of public preferences or their intensity, changing the public preferences themselves, or changing the importance of an issue to public (Burnstein 1999). That the movement may
target the public’s interests or the legislator’s interests is an important distinction, but Burnstein only briefly suggests the idea that one of these audiences may be more salient at one time or another. He does not adequately analyze how a movement would shift its tactics if its audience shifted, and he certainly does not discuss the movement as having agency in determining which strategies it will implement at given times.

Another set of works that explicitly addresses tactical change but does not address agency is that on tactical innovation. Doug McAdam’s work on the black movement is perhaps the best example of this. He analyzes the US civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s and argues that even successful tactics are countered at some point, necessitating tactical innovation on the part of the movement (McAdam 1983). Though this work suggests when new tactics may be necessary, however, it does not explain how the new tactics are actually chosen. The movement must react to its opponent’s strategies, but McAdam does not tell us how exactly the movement will respond, other than to claim that they are limited to strategies that they have not previously used. There is much room, then, for further investigation of how movements actively chose what strategies to undertake not only initially but as the movement evolves.

Another limitation of the strategies literature to this point is that it often considers only a narrow definition of strategies, limited to physical types of mobilization or agitation. It is necessary to consider, though, how the language of appeals is itself a strategy that a movement formulates. Even works that do suggest how movements’ strategies may evolve, such as McAdam’s work on tactical innovation and Tarrow’s discussion of how mobilizational decline leads to more violent strategies, consider just physical tactics. In other work, Tarrow explains a different reason that tactics may become violent, using protest cycles to examine not only movement emergence (discussed above) but movement strategies. Tarrow claims that the social movement sector is internally competitive, and the competition between movement organizers for people’s support leads different groups to adopt different strategies of mobilization and different forms of interaction with elites. Because established groups have a monopoly on the conventional forms of contention, newer groups must use more radical forms to draw more attention than their competitors (Tarrow 1989, 19). This work, unlike Tarrow’s 1998 book, does suggest agency here in the choice to use more violent tactics. Though this type of insight into why a movement will choose certain tactics is helpful, it nonetheless focuses too heavily on the physical tactics that a movement will undertake.

It is problematic that works discussing various types of strategies (violent and non-violent; changing and unchanging) do not see rhetoric as among the strategic options that movements have. Though this is a weakness of the literature overall, there are two notable individual works that do address the importance of language in strategic decisions. One is Jasper’s 2004 work discussed above which emphasizes the need for a strategic model to allow for more focus on agency and less on structure. He discusses various strategic choices that the movement must make, such as how much to bureaucratize and how far to expand its goals, and a key one of these choices relates to rhetoric. A movement must consider whether to emphasize the content of its complaint or the form and rhetoric of its complaint (Jasper 2005). The strategic consideration of the emphasis of language is a key contribution of Jasper in

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8 For another perspective on how movement cycles influence violence levels, see Kriesi et al 1995/
this work; however, whether to emphasize language need not be the dichotomous strategic choice that Jasper paints it as. Instead, it will be useful to analyze how the movement decides what type of language will be the most effective.

Perhaps the work that best addresses how language itself may be considered a strategy is Polletta and Jasper’s 2001 piece. They argue that in determining what strategies movements use, it is necessary to focus not just on the instrumental rationality of movement leaders or on resource constraints; rather, identity must be taken into account. Strategies are chosen not just on structural considerations but on the need to demonstrate “who we are.” For example, a pacifist movement may chose to emphasize this identity in order to protest a war, and will find non-violent tactics such as marches most effective (Polletta and Jasper 2001). Polletta and Jasper make the excellent point that an emphasis on identity shapes the strategic language that a movement will use, but unfortunately this is not the main focus of this work, and their principal argument explains how the identity of a movement influences which physical tactics it employs.9

The large subset of the social movement literature that discusses framing, in contrast to the strategies literature, does address the importance of language (Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford 1986, Snow and Benford 1988, Morris and Mueller 1992, Snow and Bendord 1994, Johnston and Klandermans 1995, Mc Adam, McCarthy and Zald 1996, Hart 1996, Benford 1997, Jasper 1997, 1999, Benford and Snow 2000). Social movement frames are sets of beliefs and meanings around which social movements orient their actions. It is cultural frames which allow the activities undertaken by social movements to be seen as legitimate (Snow and Benford 1992).

Though the framing literature is quite useful in considering language as a strategy that the movement has agency in forming, it unfortunately does not address framing as an active and ongoing tactic. The movement plays an important role in creating the frame, yet much of this literature analyzes frames as a background context to the social movement’s actions once the frames are established. Even works that emphasize the importance of framing nonetheless claim that the movement must work hard to create the frame that it finds most effective so that this frame will then play a background role through which its primary actions are interpreted. Some works go further in expressing the confining quality of frames, with Tarrow for example arguing that a movement wants to create new symbols or frames to inspire mobilization but that it is constrained in its ability to do so because symbols that are too radical will be unfamiliar and will undermine potential action (Tarrow 1998). Frame creation, then, encounters the same problem caused by the repertoire of physical tactics, that new strategies must be only marginally different from old ones.

Much of the framing literature also discusses the limitations of framing in terms of cultural constraints, as movements must choose frames that resonate with the existing culture. Studies of various types of movements have concluded that a frame will only be effective where it draws on existing narratives familiar to society; otherwise, the movement’s language will lack “cultural resonance” and will not encourage mobilization and action (D’Anjou and Van Male 1998, Kubal 1992, Weed 1997, White 1999, Benford and Snow 2000).44 As with the repertoire literature, this notion that the possible frames

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9 This main argument will be discussed in later chapters, as it helps explain the physical tactics used by Bolivia’s indigenous movement.
are limited by various factors implies that framing is not actually as active of a strategy as it would appear, and that the movement has limited or no agency in the selection of its strategic rhetoric. This view is helpful in pointing out the constraints that a movement must consider, but it does not explain how movements choose from among their options.

Another weakness in the framing literature, and one that again echoes a gap in the repertoire literature, is the discussion of frames as static. Because much of the framing literature does not consider how movements actively choose from among available frames, it would be difficult for it to address why movements choose one frame at a certain time and a different one later. One subset of the framing literature which does not consider how frames may change but where doing so would be particularly useful is that on victimization framing (Best 1987, Benford and Hunt 1992, Weed 1997, White 1999, Benford and Snow 2000). To create a victimization frame, the movement must make clear who or what is victimizing it. For example, Aaronette White describes how during the appeals campaign of Mike Tyson, black feminists launched an anti-rape campaign that framed black women as victims based on both racial and gender factors, finding that the identification of both racism and sexism as the forces causing victimhood was key to the campaign’s success (White 1999). Clearly identifying the opposing forces is undoubtedly a crucial task for the movement; it is also important to consider, though, that the movement’s prime opposition may change. In this case, although the black feminist movement identifies both racism and sexism as its opponents, does it always place equal emphasis on the two factors? Or does it focus on one or the other depending on the particular issue that it is campaigning about at a particular time? Such considerations of how frames may change as a movement’s key opponent shifts would be particularly useful.

In addition to addressing such gaps, my research will also add to the social movement literature by introducing a new tactic which groups may use, that of identity-based appeals toward a politician who was previously a member or even leader of the movement. Most theories of social movements assume that the target is an actor distinct from the movement, yet it is necessary to consider how the dynamics between the movement and the target change when the target is especially sympathetic to the movement’s goals, particularly due to former involvement with the movement. In this case, a new tactic is open to the groups, as they may accuse the target of abandoning his previous ties to them. Such claims should be especially effective when these ties concern the leader’s ethnicity, as in the case of Morales. The strategy of identity-based appeals is not developed in the literature but is one which groups may use to achieve their policy goals.

**Theory**

I argue that this strategy of identity-based appeals is a main way in which a social movement adjusts to the election of its leader. Once a leader is elected, of course, there are various ways in which the movement may progress. It is possible that the leader will act on behalf of the movement and implement its policy goals, in which case the assumptions of the ethnic parties literature cited above will be largely correct, and the social movement may apply less pressure than was previously necessary. However, it is also possible that the leader will stray from enacting the movement’s goals, at
which point the movement must continue to apply pressure but now has the new tool of identity-based appeals available to it.

Identity-based appeals may be directed at different audiences at different points in time, all with the goal of influencing the leader’s policy decisions. The first audience is the leader himself, meaning that in the Bolivian case, the indigenous believe such accusations will directly impact Evo Morales and cause him to feel guilt that he is not doing enough to protect his own people; their hope is that he thus decides to give in to their policy demands even if doing so would not otherwise be his most rational political strategy. This guilt may be reinforced by the fact that Morales not only shares an ethnicity with the indigenous people but identifies strongly with this ethnicity, as demonstrated by the language of his campaign speeches, inauguration addresses, and other statements, as well as his work on behalf of indigenous interests prior to his election as president. In fact, indigenous organizations often cite Morales’ previous speeches to show that he is not supporting his own people as he had promised to do.

Second, identity-based appeals may be used by the leaders of indigenous organizations to mobilize indigenous communities into action. Protests and marches are common tactics of the indigenous movement, and these require a large number of participants to be effective. Identity-based appeals may thus be used to incite anger among the indigenous population and to call attention to the notion that their leader has betrayed them. The third audience is the public, which may be both domestic and international. Here, the movement points out what it sees as the leader’s betrayal of campaign promises so as to attract more people to its cause. If the movement can convince the public that the leader is dishonest and manipulative, people will be more likely to sympathize with the movement against the leader. The goal here is to gather enough force to put a level of pressure on the government that the movement alone would not be able to apply.

These audiences are not necessarily mutually exclusive, though I argue that which one is most important at any given time does shift. Before any audience is targeted for identity-based appeals, though, the movement and leader enjoy a “honeymoon phase” during which the movement still believes that the election of its former leader will be sufficient to see its goals met. In this period, the movement makes very few identity-based appeals. Immediately after the movement sees that its leader is not behaving as it had expected, though, it appeals to him directly with the hope of reigning him back in with reminders that he is one of them. The best hope that the movement has at this point is that the leader shifts paths and begins to implement the policies that it had demanded from the beginning. Only upon realizing that these direct appeals are ineffective will the movement then look for an alternative way in which to pressure the government, namely, by directing these appeals at the public to gather strength. Thus, the strategies of the movement follow three phases of identity-based appeals: the honeymoon phase in which few such appeals are made, then the use of shaming language aimed directly at the president, and finally identity-based appeals primarily targeted indirectly at the public.

The idea that identity-based appeals become important means that my theory only applies to social movements which revolve around identity. Arguably, all social movements have some form of identity as a basis; however, the argument will best apply to cases of inherent shared identity such as ethnicity. It is here where it is most obvious to all audiences that the target shares the identity of the movement, allowing identity-based appeals to have greater effect.
Background

As noted above, Evo Morales emerged out of the indigenous movement, and he saw immense support from this sector in becoming the region’s first indigenous president in 2006 and in being reelected in 2009. Morales has made indigenous rights prominent in all of his presidential bids, including his unsuccessful 2002 run. His MAS party during this campaign advocated in its platform indigenous land and water rights, indigenous justice, bilingual education, and new labor laws against ethnic discrimination (Madrid 2012, 56). In addition to these official stances, Morales has throughout his career actively campaigned for the legalization of the coca leaf which is widely used among Bolivia’s indigenous population, pointing out that it has many meanings and uses beyond illegal drug activity. In a 2006 speech at the UN Assembly shortly after his first election, Morales held up a coca leaf and declared, “This is a green coca leaf, it is not the white of cocaine, this coca leaf represents Andean culture, it is a coca leaf that represents the environment and the hope of our peoples.”10 Though not strictly an indigenous issue, Morales’ promotion of the legalization of the coca leaf drew many indigenous supporters.

Because of his indigenous identity and his campaigning on behalf of indigenous rights, the movement strongly supported Morales’ elections and played a key role in his victories.11 In the 2005 election, Morales won 74 percent of the vote in majority Quechua-speaking municipalities and 73 percent in majority Aymara-speaking municipalities, but just 39 percent in majority Spanish-speaking municipalities.12 As Aymara and Quechua are the two most widely spoken indigenous languages, these data show that Morales drew much of his support from predominantly indigenous areas. This discrepancy was repeated in 2009, with Morales winning 90 percent of the vote in majority Quechua-speaking municipalities and 95 percent in majority Aymara-speaking municipalities, but only 59 percent in majority Spanish-speaking municipalities.13 The percentage of Quechua or Aymara speakers in a municipality is still statistically significant in determining the percentage of that municipality voting for MAS even when poverty is controlled for (Madrid 2012, 58). Moreover, 2006 public opinion data shows that factors that increased the likelihood of an individual voting for Morales in the 2005 election include self-identification as indigenous (while self-identification as white decreased the likelihood of voting for Morales), speaking Aymara as one’s maternal language, speaking Quechua as one’s maternal language, and speaking another indigenous maternal language.14 This survey also shows that 71.1 percent of indigenous self-reported that they had voted for Morales, compared to 63.6 percent of mestizos speaking only indigenous languages, 34.2 percent of mestizos speaking only Spanish, and

11 As will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, the indigenous were somewhat disappointed with Morales by the December 2009 election, but they supported him in great numbers because at this point they still believed him to be the best option to champion their rights.
12 Data from Corte Nacional Electoral, cited in Madrid 2012, 57.
13 Ibid.
The indigenous were clearly a strong factor in Morales’ rise to power, which in addition to his indigenous identity itself, has been important in shaping their interactions since then. While Morales did greatly advance indigenous rights on paper with the new constitution of 2009, many indigenous leaders maintain that in practice, these rights are insufficiently met and that the constitution is not fully complied with. Main issues on which the movement and the current government are divided include the number of reserved indigenous seats in the Legislative Assembly, the implementation of indigenous autonomy, and land disputes in which the indigenous complain that their native lands are being exploited for the government’s development projects. The most prominent and ongoing example of such a dispute involves the proposed building of a highway through el Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure (TIPNIS), a national park composed of traditional indigenous lands. The indigenous have conducted two marches in protest of the highway traversing the park, one from August to October 2011, and one from April to June 2012.

Though many of the issues just discussed, particularly resource extraction at the expense of environmental protection of indigenous lands, have been contentious since before Morales became president, how the indigenous have mobilized around the issues and the strategies they have used in attempting to achieve their goals have certainly evolved in reaction to his presidency. Unfortunately, much of the recent literature on the Bolivian indigenous movement has neglected to analyze this dynamic. Many works published in the last few years do not even mention that the indigenous have been disappointed with Morales (Fabricant and Gustafson 2011, Pearce 2011, Artaraz 2012. Madrid 2012). They explain indigenous political issues as if the fact that the indigenous had high hopes for an indigenous president, hopes which have now not been met, has caused no change in indigenous tactics because they simply go back to pressuring the state in the same way they always did. Those works that do discuss how Morales has disappointed the indigenous’ expectations only examine what policies have been contentious. There are many works criticizing how the Morales government has handled oil extraction, environmental concerns, the consultation process, and other issues (Sanjinés 2010, Anthias 2012, Bebbington and Humphreys-Bebbington 2012, McNeish 2012, Stefanoni 2012). However, these discussions do not analyze in depth the indigenous’ reaction to the policies or how they have changed their strategies upon realizing that Morales would not fulfill their expectations.

Certainly, the indigenous movement’s shared identity with Morales is not the only factor shaping its struggle or its tactics. The indigenous have been fighting for protection of their lands and rights since long before Morales’ presidency, and many of their strategies and appeals, such as seeking international protection of indigenous rights, have not changed because of Morales. The fight of the indigenous for equal rights as Bolivian citizens is a matter of human rights protection and basic rule of law; identity politics is just one dimension of the indigenous struggle. It is this dimension, though, that has become increasingly important to the movement’s strategies since Morales’ election, when the movement has been able to appeal its shared ethnicity with the president.

Though I analyze the relationship between the indigenous movement and the government here, it should be noted that there are divisions within the movement as well, key among which is that between the highland and lowland indigenous. However, the movement nonetheless unites as one force against

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15 Data from 2006 LAPOP, cited in Madrid 2008.
the state because of its common goals such as defending native territory. As one leader of the highlands organization el Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Marcas del Qollasuyu (CONAMAQ) put it, “If we measure the forces in comparison, the state has all the political and military and economic and coercive power, really all the power, and this structure that the state has, we cannot face it alone, neither CONAMAQ nor CIDOB [the principal lowlands organization]. So this is why we need the alliance, to join forces and fight for a common cause, to defend the dignity and the life and the rivers and the water and the environment.”

If the movement is going to achieve its goals vis-a-vis the state, then, it must in fact be a movement rather than individual uncoordinated groups. The common goals of the movement and the need to unify in order to fight against a stronger opponent are valid reasons to consider the movement as one unit. It would be possible for indigenous leaders to exaggerate the unity of the movement if their discourse were the only evidence of the movement’s solidarity. However, that the various organizations and pueblos join together to march demonstrates their common resolve. Each march that the movement undertakes lasts approximately two months and 600 kilometers, with many of the participants separated from family members and familiar land for its duration. Participating in a march to defend a territory that is not one’s own simply to appear unified would be far too costly of a signal if the appearance of unification was the prime concern rather than actual solidarity. For these reasons, the indigenous movement will be analyzed as a unified actor against the state.

This unity also allows the indigenous to be analyzed as having one common identity despite the presence of various nations within the movement. Though members of the movement identify with their own nations, they also stress that they are all indigenous. “Indigenous” is not an inherent identification for all of Bolivia’s native pueblos, but through the unity of the movement, they have come to identify as such because they understand that each pueblo has common goals and common grievances against the government. They claim that Morales has abandoned his indigenous brothers, not just his fellow Aymara individuals; “indigenous” is thus a constructed identity, and the shared ethnicity that the movement has with Morales.

Methodology
I have tested my theory primarily through two means, archival work and interviews. The archival work consisted of examining newspaper articles along with documents that indigenous organizations put forth. I used the national newspaper El Día, identifying all articles relating to indigenous demands during Morales’ presidency, from 2005 to 2012. Additionally, for these same years I examined all articles and statements put forth by the Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (CIDOB), an umbrella organization for many of the smaller indigenous groups. This organization compiles articles and documents relating to groups’ demands at the local, regional, and national levels, and its archive thus includes the full set of material put forth by the movement. The combination of these two sources allowed me to analyze the pattern of demands made through the media and directly from the indigenous movement’s own documents.

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For the interview portion of my work, I spoke with leaders of the indigenous movement, activists, and members of NGOs who work directly and indirectly with the movement. I selected leaders from within each of the main regional organizations discussed above, CIDOB and CONAMAQ, as well as leaders of smaller organizations and communities. This selection allowed me to determine if opinions varied widely by region or organization level, or by the nature of one’s ties to the movement (for example, NGO work versus indigenous community leadership). I did not find any systematic differences among responses based on these factors. I asked the interview subjects about how the movement has changed throughout the years that Morales has been in office and what strategies they find most effective. In particular, I inquired about why the movement uses the language of identity-based appeals, who they have hoped hears this message now and in the past, and what role the public has played and currently does play. I also asked whether the individual believed that Morales continued to support indigenous rights. I conducted the interviews in a semi-structured manner, asking similar questions of each individual so as to compare answers across a range of indigenous leaders, activists, and NGO members. Though the interviews were structured in this way, I also allowed time for each subject to speak openly about the issues he or she felt were of most importance. This combination of structured and open questions allowed me to gain maximum insight from each subject while retaining a consistent format to facilitate comparisons across individuals.

Identity-Based Appeals in the Bolivian Case

The indigenous movement in Bolivia has changed its strategy since the election of Evo Morales, as identity-based appeals have become a tool available to the movement which it obviously could not use before one of its members took power. The audience to which these appeals are primarily directed has also changed over time. Identity-based appeals were not used prior to Morales’ election simply because they could not be, but neither were they used immediately after he took the presidency, as he enjoyed a honeymoon period during which he and the movement remained unified. It was during this period that the 2009 constitution was passed, detailing indigenous rights previously unheard of in Bolivia or elsewhere. Shortly after the new constitution came into effect, however, the government passed laws which demonstrated to the indigenous people that the constitution would not be fully complied with and that having Morales as their president would not, as they had expected, automatically mean the fulfillment of their agenda. A main issue at this point was that of indigenous autonomy, guaranteed under the constitution but made very difficult to achieve in practice by the Autonomy Framework Law passed only two months later. The indigenous movement undertook a march in the summer of 2010 with this issue prominent in its platform of demands, and surrounding this march were many identity-based appeals, as leaders repeatedly stated that Morales should respect their right to govern their own territories because he himself comes from indigenous background and should understand and comply with the demands of his people. For example, Víctor Eamara, a representative from one of CIDOB’s regional organizations, explained that the Framework Law showed that “the bases mean little or nothing to this government of Evo Morales, those bases which took him to power but whom he is now

turning his back on.”

Leaders continued at this point, though, to refer to Morales as one of their brothers, showing their belief that he might once again act as an indigenous “should.” For instance, Ernesto Noé, an indigenous representative in the department of Beni, stated that, “We are seeing a negative attitude from our brother the President… we are not seeing the change that we desired from the President, as we desired that he attend to the most humble sectors of the population.”

Moreover, the march of 2010 ended with an agreement before even reaching its destination of La Paz, and most of the indigenous demands were met. That the indigenous achieved an agreement with the Morales government showed that they had not given up hope on this point that he would act “properly indigenous” and comply with their demands.

The following year, 2011, the issue of TIPNIS became prominent, with another march taking place from August to October in protest of the highway project through the park. Again, the movement widely used identity-based appeals, with CONAMAQ representative Fausto Challapa complaining, for example, that Morales talked plenty about defending the environment and even being the spiritual leader of the indigenous when in reality he was destroying their lands.

Again, though, leaders continued to refer to Morales as one of their brothers and to express hope that he would fulfill his promises to them. TIPNIS president Fernando Vargas said that, “We truly hope that president Evo Morales is the defender of land rights, that he understands the worries and needs of us indigenous.”

Indeed, after this march achieved a law declaring that TIPNIS was intangible, CIDOB leader Adolfo Chávez stated that, “We are not enemies. We are brothers, of flesh and blood... We want to keep living in peace, without damage, without offense. We are brothers.” At the end of this 2011 march, then, it appeared that identity-based appeals had achieved their aim of bringing Morales back to his indigenous roots and meeting the demands of his people.

Soon after the agreement to declare TIPNIS intangible, however, the government overturned this law and shifted its position to again proclaim that the highway must be built. In reaction, the indigenous movement decided to undertake another march on the issue, beginning in April 2012. While ethnic shaming continued, leaders no longer expressed hope that Morales would remember his indigenous identity and act in their favor sheePLY out of conscious or guilt. It seems, then, that the overturning of a previous agreement to protect the park was such a betrayal as to be a key turning point in the relationship between Morales and the indigenous and in the way that the indigenous use identity-based appeals.

That the indigenous movement has no longer hoped to directly influence Morales with its identity-based appeals during this year’s march is evidenced in two ways. First, many leaders now claim that Morales is not indigenous. They may admit that he does biologically come from indigenous blood, but they believe that his actions have proven that this is not his real identity. For example, Fidel Condori, Mallku of Land and Territory of CONAMAQ, said that, “Evo is not indigenous. It’s a lie that has gone...

19 “‘No nos sentimos derrotados pero sí menospreciados por Evo’,” El Día, July 25, 2010.
20 “Presidente de CIDOB conforme con la promulgación de la Ley de Autonomías,” La Prensa, July 20 2010.
21 “La ruta sobre Tipnis va sí o sí, dice la ABC,” El Día, August 6, 2011.
23 “Promulgan Ley protección del TIPNIS con diferencias sobre intangibilidad,” Periódico Digital Educación Radiofónica de Bolivia, October 25, 2011.
through international means, through any channel or newspaper. But Evo is a mask, we see this clearly. He is not formed from the indigenous, not from the indigenous visions from either the highlands or the lowlands.”\textsuperscript{24} Likewise, Macario Noza Yuco, leader of the Puerto Totora community of TIPNIS, stated that Morales “calls himself indigenous; however, he is not indigenous, because if he were indigenous, he would have taken us into account, he would have allowed us to have dialogue with him. But he is not indigenous.”\textsuperscript{25} If the movement no longer believes that Morales is actually indigenous, then appealing to his indigenous identity would clearly not be an effective or even a possible strategy. Thus, the target of these appeals is no longer primarily Morales himself.

Second, when I asked indigenous leaders whether they believed that Morales understood the message (the identity-based appeals) that because he is indigenous, he should have more respect for indigenous rights, most of them specifically told me that no, this message did not reach him. March President Bertha Bejarano said, for instance, that, “I think that the media lets our words be known, and he hears this. But really, it does not matter to the president; unfortunately, he is stubborn. He does not obey what he’s said in the past. He is not going to give anything back to the people.”\textsuperscript{26} Likewise, president of the Central de Pueblos Indígenas de Beni (CPIB) Nazareth Flores responded that, “The message reaches him, it reaches him. But he pays little attention to it. He pays very little attention to these messages. So it is as if he had not heard them.”\textsuperscript{27} Clearly, the leaders no longer retain hope that identity-based appeals will directly influence Morales’ policy decisions.

If the indigenous movement no longer believes that it can directly influence Morales through identity-based appeals, why do they continue to make such statements? These appeals continue to be useful because the audience is now the public rather than Morales. I will elaborate upon how the public is an indirect target of identity-based appeals in the following section, but I will first touch upon the third possible audience discussed above, the members of the movement themselves. It would seem that members of the movement would be motivated to participate in marches by the anger invoked through language of betrayal, but it is difficult to know for certain whether the members would have marched anyway were it not for these appeals. Marchers most commonly state their reason for participating as simply defending their territory or defending their rights, and many have participated in the movement since long before Morales became president. It may be that in the Bolivian case, then, movement members are not a key audience for identity-based appeals. However, the line between members of the movement and the public is blurry at times. Are activists on behalf of the movement members of the movement or the public, for instance? Likewise, where do social organizations which support the movement fit in? The public, broadly defined, may include these organizations as well as the general domestic and even international populace.

As discussed earlier, although the key audience of identity-based appeals shifts, the audiences need not be mutually exclusive. While many leaders have concluded that Morales is no longer indigenous, some believe that he may still turn around, suggesting that the appeals might be directed in small part at him although the public is now the main audience. For instance, Isaias Bacua Vaca, leader of the Territorio

\textsuperscript{24} Fidel Condori, interview with author, La Paz, Bolivia, June 30, 2012.
\textsuperscript{25} Macario Noza Yuco, interview with author, La Paz, Bolivia, July 5, 2012.
\textsuperscript{26} Bertha Bejarano, interview with author, Chaparina, Bolivia, May 26, 2012.
\textsuperscript{27} Nazareth Flores, interview with author, Chaparina, Bolivia, May 26, 2012.
Indígena Multiétnico (TIM) II community Palestina Rio Madre de Dios, when asked whether Morales understood the movement’s message that he should do more to protect indigenous rights because he is also indigenous, responded that, “Yes, I think that he has to listen because he has always said that he is indigenous, just like us, that he was raised this way. In his life, he was born poor like us... So I think that this message that we can tell him that as indigenous he has to respect [our rights], I think it can soften his heart so that as an indigenous, he respects our rights as indigenous people.”

Moreover, several indigenous leaders have expressed that it is Morales’ cabinet and advisors who are at fault for the government’s not respecting indigenous rights, meaning that appealing directly to Morales’ identity could cause him to act on behalf of this identity rather than listening to his advisors who have supposedly misguided him. As Oscar Martínez, advisor to the Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Norte de La Paz (CPIAP) explained, “the indigenous people, from my point of view, still have some hope with him because they have not asked that he resign. But they do want structural changes, at least of his advisors and ministers who are against indigenous rights.”

It may thus be that some people within the indigenous movement believe that Morales remains indigenous and that appealing directly to his identity can be effective; however, the movement on the whole no longer seems to believe this. Therefore, while Morales and the public may both be audiences to some extent, the key audience has shifted from the president himself to the public.

**The Public Audience**

In this section, I elaborate upon how the movement directs identity-based appeals at the public. This is primarily done through emphasizing the image of the march as peaceful and full of sacrifice, which becomes increasingly important as the need for public sympathy increases. The statements that Morales has abandoned his own people continue to be made, but for this message to reach the public, the movement must convince the public that it and the government act in opposing ways, that Morales’ discourse of being a defender of indigenous rights cannot be true because the government’s actions are completely contrary to what the movement represents.

Although the movement appealed to the public to some degree before Morales took office, its interactions with the public are now more deliberate and more specifically framed around being in opposition to Morales. Rather than simply trying to convince the larger Bolivian society that their political concerns are important, the indigenous have now gained leverage to show the public that its interests are not just important for their own sake. Instead, their struggles and interactions with the government have revealed not just what policies the president puts forth but who he truly is. The indigenous movement can now claim to have shown that the president is manipulative because he has done more than simply renege on his campaign promises; he has in fact deliberately misrepresented his very identity. The indigenous can therefore appeal to the public’s need to be informed of who their president truly is. This framing around identity allows for a much stronger public appeal than was possible before Morales, when the movement could only attempt to procure public support through emphasizing the rights that they desired, issues which unfortunately were more difficult to frame as matters of broader societal concern. Therefore, the election and subsequent policies of Morales have

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29 Oscar Martínez, interview with author, La Paz, Bolivia, July 24, 2012.
made framing, and particularly identity framing, increasingly important for the indigenous movement. Emitting this image of contrasting identity with Morales to the public occurs in several ways. First, the movement emphasizes that its means of making demands on the government is a peaceful one, specifically that the march is a pacific form of protest which does not disrupt the rest of the country. As CIDOB president Adolfo Chávez explained, “We march because we are peaceful. This is a key part of who we are, no? We are peaceful. We do not choose the option of blockades because this hurts other people, it hurts the lives of other people, and this is not our goal.” Numerous other leaders expressed the same reasons for choosing the march as a means of protest, with the key point being that peacefulness is part of the identity of the indigenous, contrary to violent actions taken by the government such as police repression during last year’s march and repression upon the march’s arrival to La Paz this year and last. This contrast of how the movement acts and how the government acts is important for showing the public that Morales cannot be who he says he is, indigenous with the intentions of protecting their rights, because a true indigenous individual would maintain the peacefulness which characterizes the indigenous people and their marches.

Likewise, the image of sacrifice during the march is important for gaining public sympathy. If the goal was simply to negotiate with the government in La Paz, then marching 600 kilometers over two months would not be necessary. Of course, marches have also occurred under other governments and thus before identity-based appeals were at play, but the need to show the march as full of great sacrifice is increasingly present as the public’s role expands. At meetings during this year’s march, leaders often discussed the advantages of showing their sacrifice. For instance, a debate was held about whether to march on Mothers’ Day (May 27), and though it was eventually decided to rest that day, several people expressed the idea that having mothers walking with their children on Mothers’ Day would demonstrate just how much sacrifice the marchers were making. In a similar meeting, a member of the logistics team gave a report on what food was lacking, to which the march leaders responded that the individual must give a press conference with this information so that people could realize the struggles of the march. Again, though marches before as well as since Morales’ election have undoubtedly been difficult, the need to show off this image of sacrifice is more important now that the movement must convince the public that it is struggling against a government which is not on its side.

The image of suffering continued to be important once the march reached La Paz, likely more so during this time because the public was physically closer and more able to be reached with the movement’s message. Notably, the movement turned down the government’s offer to provide them lodging in La Paz, instead camping in the street near the Vice Presidential building for two weeks. This act certainly drew public attention and sympathy, and allowed the movement to demonstrate how much the government, or specifically the government’s refusal to have dialogue on its terms, was causing them to suffer. Perhaps the most stark image of the march’s sacrifice in La Paz was a six-month-old child’s death from pneumonia shortly after arriving to the city. Though tragic, the march leaders nonetheless saw her death as an opportunity to advertise the message of sacrifice to the public, planning to exhibit

the coffin in the central Plaza San Francisco. It was only upon objection from the girl’s parents that this display did not take place. This desire to literally show the public what the march had cost the movement again demonstrates the importance of painting the march in a peaceful, sacrificial light while blaming the government for not following this image and in fact inflicting such suffering on the movement.

While the above images of sacrifice are certainly an attempt to show the contrast between the movement and the government, this demonstration is most clearly seen through how the movement handled incidents of police violence during the march’s stay in La Paz. On July 5, a march through the city led by Mujeres Creando, a women’s social organization supporting the indigenous, ended in police using tear gas and water hoses against the marchers, including women and children. Though how the confrontation began is unclear, what is certain is that the march leaders were eager to use the violence to their advantage. At a meeting the next morning, leaders emphasized that the public would rally behind the march in response and that the march must not be seen acting violently. One leader pointed out that a picture of one of the marchers hitting a police officer had shown up on the front page of a newspaper, and that such an image could not occur again, as the public must see the government as the perpetrators of violence and the marchers as the victims. During the same meeting, other leaders discussed how at another march through the city planned for that afternoon, there was certain to be tear gas again when they attempted to enter the main government plaza, Plaza Murillo, which the police were blockading. This was not given as a reason not to march; rather, the leaders pointed out how further violence against the movement would only boost its image and gain public support. The reason that police violence was not feared and in fact welcomed is that is quite useful for showing the opposing behaviors of the movement and the government, the “good guys” and the “bad guys.” When the prediction proved true and the police used tear gas against the march that afternoon, the leaders took advantage of the opportunity to emphasize these opposing behaviors at a large rally following the march. Several made identity-based appeals during this assembly and pointed out that while the march had arrived peacefully to La Paz, the government had responded with violent repression. This contrast underscores the difference between what the movement had expected from the government upon Morales’ entering office, support for their rights, and the government’s actual behavior. Such opposing images are key for the movement to display to the public in order to rally its support and make it an effective audience for identity-based appeals.

Further evidence of the public’s importance as an audience comes from statements by the movement’s leaders themselves. Many have directly discussed how crucial public support is, informing that “the people are important for the struggle of the indigenous. It is a grand struggle, it is not just for one small sector... we are going to unify more, because of the students, the teachers, we are going to unify the Bolivian population against him [Morales], which is not satisfied.”32 Additionally, concerns of how to appeal to the public were a common topic in march meetings. Leaders emphasized the need to keep the public informed and to keep the public on the movement’s side. At the end of the march’s stay in La Paz, they even admitted that when they sent documents to the government stressing their desire for peaceful dialogue on their platform of demands, they knew that the government would turn them down.

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32 Sabino Fuentes, interview with author, La Paz, Bolivia, July 2, 2012.
The audience for even these direct appeals to the government ceased to be the government itself but the public, so that the population could see that the march was trying to negotiate but that the government was refusing to do so. This manner of thinking from the movement leaders demonstrates the shift in their key audience.

Finally, the change in the government’s strategy from last year’s march to this year’s also shows the increased role that the public plays for the movement. The government as well as the movement has brought the battle to a public ground, with the government putting increased emphasis on countering the march’s attempts to frame itself as the victim and the government as the enemy. During the 2011 march, the government attempted to weaken the march through more direct means, including setting up blockades along its path and even using violence against the march in a widely publicized incident on September 25, 2011. In contrast, during the 2012 march the government avoided confrontations and indeed held negotiations with other groups who had planned blockades in the marchers’ path, emphasizing that the government supported the indigenous’ right to march.33 Instead of literally trying to prevent the marchers from reaching their goal in the 2012 march, the government has focused on attempting to delegitimize the march in the public eye, to counter the image that the march tries to create in this sphere. The government’s strategy of undermining the march includes alleging that is financed by rightest parties or by USAID (claims which have been made during past marches as well, but with great prominence in the latest march), and accusing the march of violence against police forces and even of attempting to rob the Central Bank, in front of which the marchers were camping for two weeks in La Paz.

In turn, the movement has become very aware that the government is fighting against them for public support and has adapted its strategies accordingly. During the march, leaders often expressed concern about the whether the government’s attempts to delegitimize the movement might be believed, with one director suggesting in late May, for instance, that the good progress the march was making was actually problematic, as it might give weight to the government’s suggestions that it was being financed by outside sources. Likewise, because the government was accusing the march of being influenced by foreign governments, a march spokesperson suggested that foreigners should not be seen partaking in the march meetings while press was present, for fear that this could be used as evidence in support of the government’s claims. The movement’s leaders have thus become quite aware that the battle between it and the government is being fought in the public arena, and that it must do everything it can to promote its own image as the peaceful, suffering victim, and the government as the violent enemy. Only with this picture in the public’s mind will identity-based appeals be most effective to the public audience.

**Conclusion**

The Bolivian case shows how the strategies of a social movement change when someone who has risen out of that movement takes office. Identity-based appeals have become an available tool for the movement, allowing it to point out the contrast between how someone of its identity “should” act and how the current president is actually behaving. Looking at the indigenous

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movement here also demonstrates how these appeals change audiences over time, with statements targeted at the president himself giving way to those aimed at the public. Though I have focused on the Bolivian case in this paper, knowing the strategies of a movement in response to its former leader’s election and actions has wide implications for understanding the behavior of a broad range of social movements and political sectors. This includes, for example, the response of United States blacks to the election and policies of Barack Obama. Both academics and policy makers tend to assume that members of a certain race or ethnicity will support a politician of that same identity, but this pattern does not always play out, as evidenced here. We must therefore seek to understand how these sectors and their leaders interact following an election. My theory represents an effort towards such knowledge, offering insights into the political behavior of minority or underprivileged groups.

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